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THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY.* By Arthur Selwyn 
Miller. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1978. Pp., xvii, 388. 
$19.95. 
In The Supreme Court: Myth and Reality, Professor Miller of 
George Washington University has gathered nine essays that he 
wrote between 1960 and 1975. Miller's subject is a big one, as the 
title of the book suggests. He examines the unique place of the 
Supreme Court in the American political order, and tries to define 
the proper bases of constitutional decision. As Miller himself says, 
this broad view makes his perspective "basically different from most 
other scholarship on the Supreme Court" (p. 9). 
But Miller's work lends itself poorly to anthology. The earliest 
essay, "The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication," is 
the intellectual kernel of this book. The five other essays from the 
1960s do little more than restate, with changes in emphasis, the 
themes of "The Myth of Neutrality." Although any one of the six 
might introduce Miller's thought appropriately, their ensemble is an-
noying - in this nine-course feast, the first six courses are all soups, 
based on the same stock. Not only do the same ideas recur from 
essay to essay; so does Miller's picturesque wording. For instance, in 
four separate essays he accuses those who profess faith in judicial 
neutrality of practicing "squid jurisprudence" (pp. 102, 128, 162-63, 
234), hiding the truth about judicial creativity "behind a cloud of 
impenetrable ink" (pp. ·128-29, 162-63, 234). 
One advantage of such monotony, however, is that the principal 
themes of the collection may be readily summarized. Miller's goal is 
to create a replacement for the classical jurisprudence destroyed by 
the legal realists. But first he endorses the realist tenets. The realists, 
says Miller, discovered in the early part of this century that the 
Supreme Court is different from other courts. Not even an ordinary 
court is an automaton that derives the result in each case from prece-
dent as a phonograph produces music from a record; the judges' 
value preferences and the zeitgeist determine the result in close cases. 
But since the Supreme Court's cases are all "close cases," the Court 
never simply applies the law - it legislates, or at least renders deci-
sions that are politically motivated. This "reality" contradicts the 
myth, which Miller imputes to the lay public, that the Justices are 
value-neutral technicians who deduce each result ineluctably from 
the Co~titution. 
Miller contends that public discourse about the Court should in-
corporate the insights of the realists, rather than preserve the old 
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
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myth. He criticizes those scholars, notably Thurman Arnold, who 
exhorted the legal community to preserve the illusion of a "rule of 
law above men, evolved solely from Reason,"1 so that men would 
not "lose themselves in an even greater illusion, the illusion that per-
sonal power can be benevolently exercised."2 Miller argues that we 
need not choose between illusion and despotism; we can be realists 
without being obscurantists. He approves the following passage (he 
quotes it identically in two essays) from Morris Cohen's Law and the 
Social Order, a passage which encapsulates Miller's approach: 
[Some scholars argue that] while the contention that judges do have a 
share in making the law is unanswerable, it is still advisable to keep the 
fiction of the phonograph theory to prevent the law from becoming 
more fluid than it already is. But I have an abiding conviction that to 
recognize the truth and adjust oneself to it is in the end the easiest and 
most advisable course. The phonograph theory has bred the mistaken 
view that the law is a closed, independent system having nothing to do 
with economic, political, social, or philosophical science. If, however, 
we recognize that courts are constantly remaking the law, then it be-
comes of the utmost social importance that the law should be made in 
accordance with the best available information, which it is the object of 
science to supply.3 
Miller thus accepts the work of the legal realists but says that we 
must transcend their efforts. No longer can we content outselves 
with pointing out that the Praetor has no robe; we must reclothe him 
in twentieth-century costume.4 
With this purpose, Miller proposes a new kind of jurisprudence: 
"[t]he suggestion we make is for a teleological jurisprudence, one pur-
posive in nature rather than 'impersonal' or 'neutral'" (p. 76, empha-
sis in original). But in Miller's new teleology, the goals recede before 
our grasp. Since "the results of a process of 'reasoning' depend en-
tirely upon what premises (ie., values) are used in that process" (p. 
74), Miller suggests that every Justice "set out in explicit form his 
value preferences as he understands them" (p. 74). Yet Miller con-
cedes that "it is highly unlikely that any method of judicial opinion-
writing can plainly and fully enunciate 'the real bases of decision' " 
(p. 74). 
If Miller cannot ·require judges to confess their legislative values 
directly, he contents himself with an indirect route: he would have 
"operational thinking become the outward rule, rather than the hid-
den actuality'' (p. 82). Judicial opinions, that is, should refer more 
1. P. 86, quoting Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1311 (1960). 
2. Id. 
3. P. 87, quoting M, COHEN, The Process o:f Judicial Legislation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL 
ORDER 380 n. 86. The same quotation appears at p. 129. 
4. q: p. 100 ("The upshot is that it is high time for general acceptance of the fact that the 
Emperor has no clothes."). 
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explicitly to "the effects of a given decision" (p. 82). This would help 
create, he says, "a sociology of judicial decision-making" (p. 82). 
"Disputes are and should avowedly be settled in terms of the exter-
nal consequences of their application - with those consequences 
spelled out in some degree of particularity" (p. 83). Judges should 
evaluate these consequences "in terms of the realization or non-reali-
zation of stated societal values" (p. 83). But alas, "[w]hat those val-
ues might be, we do not now set forth" (p. 83). 
Apparently feeling uncomfortable with a teleology completely 
lacking goals, Miller recounts with approval two attempts to provide 
a set of "societal values"; neither is credible. First, M.S. McDougal's 
proposal for a law of "human dignity'' seems impossibly vaporous, 
at least in Miller's one-paragraph summary. McDougal would have 
judges seek "to promote the greatest production and widest possible 
sharing, without discriminations irrelevant to merit, -of all values 
among all human beings."5 Second, Alexander Pekelis's·'jurispru-
dence of welfare" seems a thinly disguised tautology: "[a]lthough 
welfare is 'an ambiguous concept,' 'it assumes as its end the ethical 
and political ideals professed by our society and attempts to find in 
the arsenals of judicial doctrine and social science the means for 
their realization.' "6 
Finally, Miller seems to conclude that the search for goals, earlier 
postponed and then shunted to other scholars, must now be aban-
doned: 
A teleologically-oriented jurisprudence is not, it should be stressed, 
a device to provide the answers to a given set of circumstances. 
Rather, it is a method - a mode of inquiry, a way to approach consti-
tutional questions. It is opposed to a mechanistic view of the social 
and judicial processes. It seeks to provide purposive direction to the 
fl.ow of social events. By asking the welfare or the human dignity ques-
tion, the judge must think in terms of consequences and will help in 
providing some guiding lights for the attainment of the democratic 
ideal. [P. 85.] 
Miller's teleology is thus a call for purposiveness-without-a-purpose. 
It stands only in opposition to mechanistic theories of jurisprudence, 
and requires those theories as a polemical prop. 
Robert G. McCloskey's general criticism of the excesses of legal 
realist thought could as easily have been directed specifically at 
Miller's extension of the realist approach: 
[Some] "[l]egal realists," impressed by the discovery that the Supreme 
Court [is] more than a court, [are] sometimes prone to treat it as if it 
were not a court at all, as if its "courthood" were a pure fa«?de for 
5. P. 83, quoting McDougal, Perspectives far an International Law of Human Dignity, 53 
AM. SocY. INTL. L. PROCEEDINGS 107 (1959). 
6. P. 84, quoting A. PEKELIS, The CasefaraJurisprudenceof We!fare, in LAW AND SOCIAL 
ACTION 33, 37 (1950). 
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political functions indistinguishable from those performed by the legis-
lature. Such a view bypasses everything that is really interesting about 
the- institution. . . . 
. . . The Court's claim on the American mind derives from the 
myth of an impartial, judicious tribunal whose duty it is to preserve 
our sense of continuity with the fundamental law.7 
For McCloskey, the myths surrounding the Court have arisen out of 
an inherent contradiction: the Court must preserve both the ideal of 
the rule of law above men and the ideal of popular political sover-
eignty. To end the myth would be "to align the judicial power 
squarely with the legislative power and to erase the differentiation of 
function that is the Court's basis for being."8 Miller ignores these 
subtleties and defines myths simply as "erroneous or false" beliefs 
that hide the unambiguous "reality" (p. 14). But if, in fact, myths 
continue to shape our thoughts and actions despite our doubts about 
their ultimate truth, legal scholars should try to understand why 
myths persist before they propose, as Miller does, that we renounce 
them. 
One must admit, however, that Miller asks fundamental ques-
tions, and asks them in a lively manner sure to continue the debate 
about the Court's place in government. Perhaps, ultimately, we can 
excuse Miller's impatience with ambiguity; it may serve as a neces-
sary antidote to complacency. And in later essays, he has moved 
beyond the debate about neutral principles. Chapter seven calls for 
more sociological evaluation of the effects of the Court's work. 
Chapter eight criticizes the adversary process as an inadequate 
means of channeling technical information to the court. Chapter 
nine examines what Miller sees as "a diminution in the confidence 
people have in judges" (p. 315). Chapter Ten concludes that the 
Court protects the right of privacy "only when the fundamental in-
terests of the State are not jeopardized" (p. 343). These later essays 
abandon the rhetoric of teleology; instead they acknowledge the 
problems of a judiciary required to perform legislative functions. 
One only wishes that Professor Miller had compressed the argu-
ments of his earlier essays into one or two brief chapters. Instead of 
making vague exhortations for a purposive decision-making, he 
might have studied the institutional constraints that have produced 
the existing "myth." His later work would have benefited from such 
a study. His book would have been slimmer, but more compelling. 
7. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 20 (1960). 
8. Id. at 21. 
